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Abstract. This study investigates the hypothesis that higher levels of economic freedom in an 
“economic region” promote a higher level of economic activity and hence yield higher levels of 
per capita real income (GDP) in that economic region, ceteris paribus. However, in the pursuit of 
a broader perspective, this study also investigates the hypothesis that the higher the taxation level 
relative to GDP, the lower the per capita real income level. Finally, in the pursuit of a broader 
perspective, this study also investigates the hypothesis that higher quality regulation leads to 
higher per capita real income level.  
  
1. Introduction 
Over the past quarter of a century, numerous studies have been conducted expressly to 
investigate the impact of economic freedom on economic growth.  Most of these empirical 
studies find that there exists a strong, positive impact of economic freedom, especially a measure 
of overall economic freedom, on the rate of economic growth (Ali, 1997; Ali and Crain, 2001, 
2002; Arora and Vamvakidis, 2006; Cebula, 2011; Clark and Lawson, 2008; Dawson, 1998, 
2003; De Haan and Strum, 2000; Goldsmith, 1995; Gwartney, Holcombe, and Lawson, 2006; 
Heckelman, 2000; Heckelman and Stroup, 2000; Norton, 1998; Tortensson, 1994).  Indeed, the 
study by Cole (2003, p. 196) concludes that, “. . . economic freedom is a significant factor in 
economic growth, regardless of the basic theoretical framework.”  This generalization is 
predicated presumably upon the argument that increased economic freedom elevates the growth 
of economic activity through incentives to work, invest, save, hire/dismiss, make business 
decisions, and take risk in a market-based economy.    
The present study focuses on a similar, but not identical, potential and reasonable impact 
of higher economic freedom levels, namely, higher real income levels.1  In particular, this study 
investigates the hypothesis that higher levels of economic freedom in an “economic region” 
promote a higher level of economic activity and hence yield higher levels of per capita real 
income (GDP) in that economic region, ceteris paribus. However, in the pursuit of a broader 
perspective, this study also investigates the hypothesis that the higher the taxation level relative 
to GDP, the lower the per capita real income level. Finally, in the pursuit of a broader 
perspective, this study also investigates the hypothesis that higher quality regulation leads to 
higher per capita real income level.  
 To provide a broad and diverse context for the empirical analysis of these joint 
hypotheses, we begin with the observation that, in the Global Economy of the 21st century, the 
nature of what constitutes a region for economics purposes can easily transcend that of merely 
some arbitrary or non-arbitrary geographic or politically delineated portion of a single nation.  
Indeed, a “nation” can very reasonably be defined as a “region” per se, such as in the case of an 
organization like the OECD (consisting of 30 nations/regions in the early years of this century 
and of 34 nations/regions as of 2010).2 Within this perspective, the present study investigates 
whether “regional” per capita real income differentials are a function of differential levels of 
economic freedom, differential tax burden levels, and differentials in the quality of government 
regulation.3  The study period runs from 2003-2009 and encompasses a panel dataset estimated 
                                                 
1 This emphasis on economic freedom and the per capita real income level is compatible, in principle, with that in 
Wiseman and Young (2011) for states within the U.S., and with certain other studies, including Grubel (1997), Islam 
1996), Nissan and Niroomand (2008), and Cebula (2013). 
2 One compelling reason to study the OECD is to control for the fact that all of the countries are at least somewhat 
similar and therefore are more reasonably comparable in their parallel development.   
 
3 In addition, this study investigates whether higher taxation reduces per capita real income and whether higher 
regulatory quality and greater political stability act to elevate per capita real income and thus act to create income 
differentials. 
using the fixed effects model. A variety of estimates are provided to test the resiliency and 
consistency of the findings of the basic model.  
2. The Framework 
In this study, per capita real income is measured by the per capita real GDP in each of the OECD 
nations over the eight-year study period from 2003 through 2009.  Per capita real income, RPCY, 
is a measurement that parallels, in principle, what has been the focus of most of the more recent 
related studies on macroeconomic growth, which is the percentage rate of change (rather than 
the level) of per capita real income or the percentage rate of change of real GDP (Tortensson, 
1994; Cebula, 2011; Goldsmith, 1995; Ali, 1997; Norton, 1998; Dawson, 1998, 2003; Cole, 
2003; Hall, Sobel, and Crowley, 2010).  The value of per capita real income is made comparable 
across nations by PPP (purchasing-power-parity) adjustments.  Given the emphasis in this study 
on the role of economic freedom in determining per capita real income and regional differentials 
thereof, the most fundamental hypothesis of this study is that per capita real income (as defined) 
depends directly upon economic freedom (FREEDOM) in each of its various studied forms, 
ceteris paribus. In addition, per capita real income is hypothesized to be a decreasing function of 
the tax burden, expressed as a percent of GDP, TAXREVGDP,4 because higher tax burdens 
reduce disposable income and limit the ability to purchase new goods and services and thereby 
restrict the level of economic activity. In addition, per capita real income is hypothesized to be an 
increasing function of regulatory quality, REGQUAL,5 adopted in lieu of business freedom, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4 As explained below, TAXREVGDP is adopted in lieu of the Heritage Foundation (2013) economic freedom 
referred to as fiscal freedom, 
 
5 As explained below, REGQUAL is adopted in lieu of the Heritage Foundation (2013) economic freedom referred 
to as business freedom, 
 
because high quality regulations interferes less with the efficiency functioning of the market 
economy (Upadhyaya, Raymond, and Mixon, 1997; Ugur, 2009; Yandle, 2013).  
Per capita real income is also hypothesized to be a function of political stability as well as 
a variety of other economic variables, such as unemployment rates and interest rates (OTHER). 
Thus, the basic framework for analysis is expressed, as follows: 
RPCYjt= f(FREEDOMnjt, TAXREVGDPjt, REGQUALjt, POLSTABjt, OTHERjt)        (1) 
where RPCYjt is the level of the purchasing-power-parity adjusted per capita real GDP (income) 
in OECD nation j in year t; FREEDOMnjt refers to the value of  the economic freedom measure 
(index) n in nation j in year t (n=8 in several of the estimates, as explained below); 
TAXREVGDPjt is the ratio of all taxes within nation j in year t, expressed as percent;  
REGQUALjt refers to the role played by government in the economy under the rubric of 
regulations and in fact is an index  that measures the overall quality of those regulations in 
nation/region j in year t; POLSTABjt is an index that measures the degree of political stability in 
each nation/region j in year t; and OTHERjt refers to the values of explicitly fundamental 
economic control variables, namely the unemployment rate and long term interest rate) in nation 
j in year t. A trend variable is also included in the empirical estimates; interestingly, although this 
variable is linear, use of a non-linear trend variable in its place does not alter the conclusions.  
a. Economic Freedom, The Tax Burden, and Regulatory Quality 
This study initially considers the economic freedom indices developed by The Heritage 
Foundation (2013).  An alternative measure of economic freedom is also considered in the 
estimates, one based on Gwartney and Lawson (2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). 
Based on the central hypothesis investigated in this study, as stated above, per capita real income 
is expected to be an increasing function of both of these indices of economic freedoms, ceteris 
paribus.    
Evidence in various forms of a positive impact of economic freedom on per capita 
income can be found in several prior studies. These studies include a fundamentally graphical 
cross-country analysis by Grubel (1997, pp. 289-291, esp. Figure 1) from which the author infers 
that countries with higher levels of economic freedom have higher per capita income levels. 
Another of these papers is a cross-section study by Islam (1996) of countries for the year 1992. 
The cross-section estimates in Islam (1996) find a direct impact of economic freedom on per 
capita income in low income countries and all countries taken as a group. A cross-section study 
of states in the U.S. by Wiseman and Young (2011) also finds evidence of a positive impact of  
economic freedom on per capita income. Finally, Cebula (2013), examines each of the ten 
Heritage Foundation (2013) measures, while omitting any variables except these ten freedom 
measures, to find which of these specific measures actually raises per capita income; he finds 
that at least three fail to do so.   
The present study extends these studies in a variety of ways. To begin with, this study 
differs with most prior studies by focusing on the OECD nations/”economic regions.” More 
importantly, it estimates a balanced seven-year (2003 through 2009) panel dataset by fixed 
effects. Furthermore, the present study constructs an overall average measure of economic 
freedom which expressly discards two of the ten Heritage Foundation (2013) economic 
freedoms, fiscal freedom and business freedom, partly because of multi-collinearity problems 
their presence creates and partly to replace them with arguably better variables to measure what 
the fiscal freedom and business freedoms seek to measure, namely, the ratio of all taxes to GDP 
(expressed as a percent) and a direct measure of regulatory quality, the principal component of 
business freedom. These substitutions are further explained later on in this section of the study. 
Finally, the present analysis provides linear, linear-log, and log-log estimates to test for 
consistency of results, as well as introduces a number of de facto economic control variables and 
a de facto political control variable.6 
Given this context, we first identify freedom from excessive government size, or simply 
government size freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2013), an index that reflects the degree of 
freedom in an economy from the burden of excessive government in terms of expenditures (i.e., 
freedom from government on the expenditure side).  Government outlays compete with private 
agents and interfere with natural market processes, prices, and interest rates by over-stimulating 
demand and diverting resources through “crowding out” effects (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; 
Cebula, 1978; Abrams and Schmitz, 1978). This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR1. 
The trade freedom index reflects the openness of an economic system to imports of goods 
and services from other nations and the ability of citizens to interact freely as buyers and sellers 
in the global marketplace.  Government hindrance of the free flow of such commerce (through 
taxation of imports and/or exports, bans, quotas, and so forth) has a negative impact on the 
ability of individuals and firms to pursue economic goals (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This 
economic freedom is labeled as HECFR2 
A free citizenry requires a steady and reliable currency as a medium of exchange and as a 
store of value.  The monetary freedom index is an indicator of stable currency and market-
determined prices.  A high degree of monetary freedom is characterized by an independent 
central bank, policies promoting low inflation, and the absence of price controls (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013). This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR3. 
                                                 
6 Also included in all of the estimates there is a trend variable and in two of the estimates there is a dummy/binary 
variable for G8 nations. 
The investment freedom index is greater in a nation with fewer (1) restrictions on foreign 
investment, (2) restrictions that tend to limit capital inflows and outflows, and (3) restrictions 
that hinder the ability of capital to flow to its best and most efficient use.  Such restrictions 
interfere with the freedom of investors and firms seeking capital (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  
This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR4. 
Nearly all nations impose some form of supervision/oversight on banking institutions and 
the providers of other financial services, including markets for equities. The financial freedom 
index is an indicator of the degree to which the financial sector of the economy is free from 
excessive banking and financial regulation (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  This economic freedom 
is labeled as HECFR5.  
Secure property rights provide citizens the confidence to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities, including commercial activities, saving, and investing.  The ability to accumulate 
private property is the primary motivation in a market economy; a “rule of law” that effectively 
protects property rights is critical to an efficient free market economy. The greater the 
protections afforded to property rights under the rule of law, the greater the property rights 
freedom index (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR6. 
Political corruption by public officials manifests itself in many forms, including bribery, 
extortion, embezzlement, and graft, and it enables certain public officials to steal or otherwise 
profit illegitimately from public funds.  Political corruption interferes with market efficiency.  
The freedom from corruption index indicates the degree to which an economy is free from such 
forms of corruption (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR7. 
The labor freedom index is a composite index that reflects freedom from government 
wage and price controls, and, thus, measures the ability of both workers and firms to interact 
freely without restrictions imposed by government. The greater the degree of labor freedom in an 
economy, the more efficient and productive is that economy (Heritage Foundation, 2013; Nissan 
and Niroomand, 2008).   This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR8. 
The fiscal freedom index (Heritage Foundation, 2013) reflects the freedom of individuals 
and firms to keep and control their income and wealth for their own use/benefit.  Fiscal freedom 
is a measure of freedom from the burden of government (from the revenue side): the lower this 
burden, the higher the value of the fiscal freedom index. Technically, fiscal freedom includes 
freedom from both the tax burden, in terms of both the top income tax rate (on corporations and 
individuals, taken separately) and the overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of a nation’s 
GDP.  The underlying idea is that higher taxation not only interferes with the ability of 
individuals and businesses to pursue their goals in the marketplace, it may also reduce the 
incentive to work, save, invest, or take risk. This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR9. 
The business freedom index reflects the individual’s right and ability to freely conduct 
entrepreneurial activities (i.e., to create, to operate and thereby make economic, financial, and 
management decisions, and close an enterprise without government interference).  It is argued 
that burdensome, redundant regulations are the most common barriers to the free conduct of 
entrepreneurial endeavors, and indeed are a de facto form of taxation that [makes] it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to produce goods and services (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  This economic 
freedom is labeled as HECFR10. 
Of the ten economic freedoms measure above, two, HECFR9 and HECFR10, are of 
special interest here in terms of whether there is a reasonable alternative way in which to capture 
their essential significance but perhaps in either a more direct fashion or in a technically less 
problematic fashion, i.e., one that avoids multi-collinearity with one or more other variables in 
the system.  In particular, to measure economic freedom using the Heritage Foundation (2009A) 
indices of economic freedom and to address the fact that, technically, the ten economic freedoms 
interact, i.e., are overlapping, although the exact mechanisms for this interaction are not easily 
identifiable or entirely clear (Heritage Foundation, 2013), we define, with two notable exceptions 
(fiscal freedom, HECFR9 and business freedom, HECFR10) the overall economic freedom 
measure, FREEDOMjt, as the average of the economic freedoms described above, where n 
denotes the nth economic freedom: 
   8 
FREEDOMjt = ƩHECFRnjt/8, j=1,…, 29; t= 2003, 2004. 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 (2) 
      n=1 
 
 The reason for defining the overall freedom index without fiscal freedom (HECFR9) 
included is that HECFR9 is constructed in part with an unnecessary focus on just the top 
corporate and personal income tax brackets and hence neglects to provide a systematic inclusion 
of the remainder of the corporate and personal income tax structures, be they imposed by central 
governments or sub-central government entities. In point of fact, there are also other tax forms 
besides income taxation that arguably must be systematically considered when quantifying fiscal 
freedom. Furthermore, HECFR9 is highly correlated (r = 0.767) with government size freedom, 
HECFR1, and therefore also introduces a multi-collinearity problem.  Accordingly, HECFR9 is 
replaced with a simple measure of the overall tax burden in each of the “OECD regions,” 
TAXREVGDPjt . This substitute for fiscal freedom has two advantages over HECFR9: simplicity 
and comprehensiveness on the one hand, i.e., it is computed as simply the sum of all taxes in 
nation/region j in year t expressed as a percent of GDP, and on the other hand, it is not highly 
correlated with HECFR9. In the spirit of HECFR9, it is expected that real per capita income is a 
decreasing function of TAXREVGDP, ceteris paribus (Clark and Lawson, 2008; Cebula, 2011; 
Yandle, 2013). This expectation is re-inforced by the anticipated impact of higher tax rates on 
income tax evasion (Cebula, 1997; Cebula and Feige, 2012)  
 The most fundamental reason for defining the overall freedom index without business 
freedom (HECFR10) included is the simple fact that this economic freedom measure is highly 
correlated (r = 0.613) with the measure of regulatory quality adopted in this study, i.e., the basic 
composition of HECFR10 is in fact regulation. That said, in order to reflect at least in part the 
role of government in the economic environment as a regulator per se, this study adopts in place 
of the variable HECFR10 described as “regulatory quality” by the World Bank Institute (2012). 
This variable, expressed by the symbol REGQUALjt in the present study, is an index that reflects 
“…the ability of the government to provide sound policies and regulations that enable and 
promote private sector development” (World Bank Institute, 2012, p. 1). It is hypothesized that 
the greater/higher the degree of regulatory quality in nation j in year t, REGQUALjt, the greater 
the rate of real per capita GDP growth in nation j in year t is likely to be, ceteris paribus 
(Upadhyaya, Raymond, and Mixon, 1997; Ugur, 2009; Yandle, 2013, esp. pp. 5-9).7 
Economic and Political Stability Control Variables and a Trend Variable 
In addition to the hypothesized impacts of economic freedom, taxes as a percent of GDP, and 
regulatory quality on real income, this study initially includes two explicitly economic “control” 
variables, a political control variable, and a trend variable. The explicitly economic control 
variables are the percentage unemployment rate in country/region j in year t (URjt) and the ex 
post real long term rate of interest in country/region j in year t (RLONGINTjt). The 
unemployment rate variable controls for the expected negative influence of higher 
unemployment rates on per capita real income levels: the greater the percent of the labor force 
                                                 
7 The potential economic significance of regulation (good quality) is considered in a diverse literature 
(Mixon, 1994, 1995; Yandle, 1999, 2013; Clark, Boettke and Stringham, 2008). 
that is unemployed, the lower the per capita income, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the higher the 
ex post real long term rate of interest, the lower the present value of investment for firms, and 
hence the lower the rate of investment in new plant and equipment.  Moreover, the ex post real 
long term rate of interest also captures the fact that consumption, particularly that of durable 
goods, is a decreasing function of the ex post real long term rate of interest, ceteris paribus. Thus 
the higher the ex post real long term interest rate, the lower the level of economic activity and 
hence the lower the per capita real income level, ceteris paribus.  
We also introduce a political control variable for each nation/region, POLSTABjt, which 
is an index of political stability and the absence of violence in those nations/regions. It is 
hypothesized that economic prosperity for an economy as a whole should be an increasing 
function of political stability, which by its very nature, promotes orderly or lower risk decision 
making and greater efficiency for markets to function in an economic system and thereby should 
act, ceteris paribus, to elevate per capita real income.  Finally, the linear trend variable, TR, is 
included to account for trending of variables over the study period. 
For the interested reader, it is observed that the variables reflecting “regulatory quality” 
and “political stability” are in fact quite different. The variable used to measure regulatory 
quality, REGQUAL, reflects the ability of the government of a nation both to formulate and 
execute/implement sound, rational, and objective policies and regulations that not only permit 
but also promote private sector development and efficiency (World Bank, 2012, p. 5). By 
contrast, the variable political used to reflect political stability, POLSTAB, actually measures the 
perceived likelihood that the government of a nation is vulnerable to being destabilized or even 
overthrown by either constitutional or violent means, with the latter including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism (World Bank, 2012, p. 9). From a different perspective, to 
illustrate how statistically unrelated these two variables are, the zero-order correlation coefficient 
is nearly 0, i.e., r = 0.068.  
Linear Fixed Effects PLS Estimation Results 
Based on the eclectic economic freedom-based model of investigating the determination of per 
capita real income described above, the following model is to be estimated initially:8 
RPCYjt= f(HECFRjt, REGQUALjt,TAXREVGDPjt, POLSTABjt, URjt,  
RLONGINTRjt,TR)                     (3) 
  
where it is hypothesized that: 
 
fHECFR>0,  fREGQUAL>0,  fTAXREVGDP<0, fPOLSTAB>0,  fUR<0,  fRLONGINTR<0          (4) 
 
Data for each of the economic freedom variables/indices (HECFR) initially considered were 
obtained from the Heritage Foundation (2013); data for the real per capita income variable 
(RPCY) were obtained from the International Monetary Fund (2013); data for the variables 
TAXREVGDP, UR, and RLONGINTR variables were obtained from the OECD (2013); and data 
for the governance indices for quality regulation (REGQUAL) and political stability (POLSTAB) 
were obtained from the World Bank (2012). Finally, TR is a linear trend variable.  Descriptive 
statistics for each of the non-trend variables in the analysis are provided in Table 1.9  
Equation (3), which is expressed initially in linear form (but also subsequently expressed 
in linear-log form and in log-log form), was estimated by PLS (panel least squares), first using 
the random effects model and then using the fixed effects model.  In the case of this linear 
specification, a Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) was performed and it generated a t-
statistic with a p = .0436, so that the study adopted the fixed effects model.  Similar findings for 
                                                 
8 HECFR is adopted as the symbol for economic freedom based on the Heritage Foundation (2013) 
indices. In subsequent estimations, i.e., in half of those estimations, an alternative measure of economic 
freedom (Gwartney and Lawson (2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009) is substituted for HECFR. 
9 A complete dataset for Iceland was unavailable, so that only 29 of the 30 member OECD 
nations/”regions” over the study period could be studied. 
the linear-log and log-log specifications of equation (3) were obtained using the Hausman test 
(1978), i.e., in both cases, p < 0.05. Thus, these specifications were also estimated using fixed 
effects. 
Equation (3) is initially estimated in linear form, adopting the White (1980) cross-section 
correction.10 These results are provided in column (a) of Table 2, where all six of the estimated  
coefficients for the non-trend variables shown exhibit the expected signs.  Of these six 
coefficients, three are statistically significant at the 1% level, two are statistically significant at 
the 2.5% level, and one is statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, as hypothesized, these 
fixed effects results reveal that the per capita real income level among OECD nations/regions 
during the study period is an increasing function of economic freedom, regulatory quality, and 
political stability and a decreasing function of the tax burden (as a percent of GDP), as well as 
the unemployment rate and the ex post real long term interest rate. Thus, for example, bearing in 
mind that the mean of HECFR is 69.95, a one unit increase in the Heritage Foundation overall 
economic freedom index would elevate per capita real income by $348. Therefore, a rise in this 
Heritage Foundation (2013) measure of economic freedom index of 10 units would be expected 
to elevate per capita real income by approximately $3,480. In addition, a rise in the REGQUAL 
index of one unit would raise per capita real income by $382, while a rise of 1% in the 
percentage ratio of taxes to GDP would reduce per capita real income by $248. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient of determination values (the R2 and adjusted R2) imply that the model explains 
approximately two-thirds of the variation in the dependent variable, per capita real income.  
Finally, the F-ratio is statistically significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength of 
the model.    
                                                 
10 All of the estimations in this study adopt the White (1980) cross-section heteroskedasticity correction. 
The estimate in column (a) of Table 2 is predicated upon Heritage Foundation (2013) 
measures of economic freedom. As a test of credibility of the overall model and of the resiliency 
and consistency of the conclusions for the per capita real income effects of economic freedom, as 
well as the regulatory quality and tax-burden variables, the next estimation provided in Table 2 
of this study offers alternative fixed effects results of a parallel model. The only difference 
between the specification of this alternative model and that considered in column (a) is the 
measure of economic freedom. In particular, the economic freedom index HECFR from the 
Heritage Foundation (2013) is replaced by the overall measure of economic freedom from 
Gwartney and Lawson (2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009), GLECFR. In principle, the 
two economic measures HECFR and GLECFR measure much the same thing; however, as 
illustrated in Table 1, the scale of these two variables is quite different. For the study period, for 
example, the mean for the HECFR index is 69.96 whereas that for the GLECFR index is 7.5. In 
practical terms, what this implies is that should the coefficient on GLECFR be statistically 
significant, its coefficient could be much larger than that for HECFR. This is at least in part 
because, in say a linear estimation, a one unit increase in GLECFR implies approximately a 
13.33% higher degree of overall economic freedom, whereas a one unit increase in HECFR 
would be imply approximately only a 1.4% rise in overall economic freedom. 
 That observation having been made, it is also observed that in this study, equation (3) is 
estimated not only in linear form but also in linear-log form and log-log form with the HECFR 
index of economic freedom replaced by the GLECFR economic freedom index. Each of these 
versions of equation (3) was estimated by PLS (panel least squares), first using the random 
effects model and then using the fixed effects model.  A Hausman specification test (Hausman, 
1978) generated a t-statistic with a p < 0 in all cases; therefore, in all of estimates provided in 
this study the fixed effects model is adopted. 
 In the fixed effects results shown in column (b) of Table 2, all six of the estimated non-
trend coefficients exhibit the expected signs; furthermore, all six are statistically significant at the 
1% level.  In addition, the R2 value and adjusted R2 value imply that the explanatory variables in 
the model explain effectively seven-tenths of the variation in the variable RPCY. Finally, the F-
statistic is statistically significant at beyond the 1% level.  These results imply that per capita real 
income level among OECD nations/regions during the study period is found to be an increasing 
function of economic freedom, regulatory quality, and political stability, while being a 
decreasing function of the tax burden (as a percent of GDP), the unemployment rate, and the ex 
post real long term interest rate. Thus, for example, a one unit increase in the Gwartney-Lawson 
overall economic freedom index would appear to elevate per capita real income by $7,857. This 
outcome constitutes a much larger response to a one unit increase in the GLECFR index than is 
the case with the Heritage Foundation index ($348), HECFR. As observed above, however, 
much of this differential response reflects the fact that a one unit increase in the GLECFR index 
(mean=7.5) is a 13.33% increase in overall economic freedom, as opposed to a one unit increase 
in the HECFR index (mean=69.95), which is only a 1.4% rise in overall economic freedom. 
Other results of interest in column (b) would be that a rise in the REGQUAL index of one unit 
would raise per capita real income by $398, while a rise of 1% in the percentage ratio of taxes to 
GDP would reduce per capita real income by $374. These latter two results parallel those in 
column (a), although they arguably are somewhat stronger. 
 
 
3. Testing Credibility and Consistency Using Linear-log and Log-Log Estimations 
The initial results provided in Table 2 indicate strong support for the hypotheses being 
investigated here, namely, that per capita real income is an increasing function of economic 
freedom and regulatory quality and a decreasing function of the burden of taxation. To provide 
further evidence of the credibility of these results, two additional sets of findings are to be 
considered. The first involves linear-log estimates of the basic model (shown in Table 3), 
whereas the second provides log-log estimates (shown in Table 4). Indeed, two of the latter 
estimates consider an additional control variable to further test the resiliency of the findings of 
the model.  
The linear-log estimation of equation (3) using the Heritage Foundation (2013) economic 
freedom measure is provided in column (a) of Table 3, whereas the linear-log estimation of 
equation (3) adopting the Gwartney and Lawson (2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009) 
measure of economic freedom is provided in column (b) of Table 3. 
In the estimation shown in column (a) of Table 3, all six coefficients exhibit the expected 
signs. In addition, four are statistically significant at the 1% level, one is statistically significant 
at the 2.5% level, and one is statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, as in the linear 
estimates in columns (a) and (b) of Table 2, per capita real income level among OECD 
nations/regions over the study period is an increasing function of economic freedom, regulatory 
quality, and political stability, while being a decreasing function of the tax burden (as a percent 
of GDP), as well as the unemployment rate, and the ex post real long term interest rate. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of determination (R2) value implies that the model explains nearly 
two-thirds of the variation in the dependent variable, per capita real income.  Finally, the F-ratio 
is statistically significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength of the model.  Overall, 
these results are compatible with those in Table 2. Of greatest relevance, the findings for the 
economic freedom, taxation, and regulatory variables receive further validation by the linear-log 
estimations found in column (a) of Table 3.  
In the estimation shown in column (b) of Table 3, all six coefficients exhibit the expected 
signs. In addition, three are statistically significant at the 1% level, and two are statistically 
significant at the 5% level; only the coefficient on the political stability variable fails to be 
statistically significant (at even the 10% level). Thus, as in the linear estimate in columns (a) and 
(b) of Table 2, per capita real income level among OECD nations/regions over the study period 
is an increasing function of economic freedom and regulatory quality, while being a decreasing 
function of the tax burden (as a percent of GDP), as well as the unemployment rate, and the ex 
post real long term interest rate. Meanwhile, the coefficient of determination (R2) value implies 
that the model explains nearly two-thirds of the variation in the dependent variable, per capita 
real income.  Finally, the F-ratio is statistically significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall 
strength of the model.  Overall, aside from the result for the political stability variable, these 
results are compatible with those in Table 2; in other words, of greatest relevance, the findings 
for the economic freedom, taxation, and regulatory variables receive further validation from the 
linear-log results shown in column (b) of Table 3.   
Finally, we come to the log-log estimations. The results of fixed effects estimations of the 
log-log form of equation (3), in the first case using the Heritage Foundation (2013) economic 
freedom index and in the second case using the Gwartney and Lawson (2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 
2007; 2008; 2009) economic freedom index are provided in columns (a) and (c), respectively, of 
Table 4. As shown in column (a) of Table 4, all six of the estimated coefficients on the non-trend 
variables exhibit the expected signs, with four statistically significant at the 1% level and one 
statistically significant at the 2.5% level; once again, the political stability variable is not 
statistically significant at even the 10% level.11 Despite the latter result, these log-log results 
offer further support for the key findings in Table 2 in that the per capita real income level 
among OECD nations/regions during the study period is found to be an increasing function of 
economic freedom and regulatory quality while being a decreasing function of the tax burden as 
a percent of GDP.12 Meanwhile, the coefficient of determination (R2) value of 0.77 and adjusted 
R2 value of 0.75 imply that the model explains approximately three-fourths of the variation in the 
dependent variable, per capita real income.  Finally, the F-ratio is statistically significant at the 
1% level, attesting to the overall strength of the model.   
As for the findings in column (c) of Table 4, five of the six estimated coefficients on the 
non-trend variables exhibit the expected signs, with three statistically significant at the 1% level,  
one statistically significant at the 2.5% level, and one statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
this estimate, it is the long term interest rate that fails to be statistically significant at even the 
10% level and even exhibits a positive sign. Despite the latter result, these findings offer further 
support for the key findings in Table 2 in that the per capita real income level among OECD 
nations/regions during the study period is found to be an increasing function of economic 
freedom and regulatory quality as well a decreasing function of the tax burden (as a percent of 
GDP).13 Meanwhile, the coefficient of determination (R2) value of 0.79 and the adjusted R2 value 
of 0.77 imply that the model explains nearly four-fifths of the variation in the dependent 
variable, per capita real income.  Finally, the F-ratio is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
attesting to the overall strength of the model.    
                                                 
11 Technically, these “coefficients” are actually elasticities. 
12 There are also negative impacts from the unemployment rate and the ex post real long term interest rate. 
13 There is also a positive impact from political stability and a negative impact from unemployment. 
As a final test of the consistency of the model, a new variable is now added to the log-log 
specification. Specifically, this study now adopts a de facto economic control dummy variable, 
G8DUMMY, which assumes a value of 1 for a G8 nation and a value of 0 otherwise. This 
variable is included in the analysis to control for the fact that G8 nations tend to have 
educational, technology, infrastructure, and other advantages as compared with many if not most 
non-G8 nations and the fact that these advantages will tend to result in labor higher productivity 
and hence higher per capita real income levels, ceteris paribus.   
The log-log estimations of the basic model with the G8DUMMY included can be found in 
columns (b) and (d) of Table 4, where column (b) adopts the HECFR index of economic freedom 
and column (d) adopts the GLECFR index of economic freedom. In column (b), all seven of the 
estimated non-trend coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with six statistically significant at the 
1% level and one statistically significant at the 2.5% level. The coefficients of determination (R2 
= 0.79; adjusted R2 = 0.76) imply the model explains more than three-fourths of the variation in 
the dependent variable. Furthermore, the F-statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, once again, per capita real income is an increasing function of economic freedom, 
regulatory quality, and political stability. It also is positively impacted by having G8 status. Per 
capita real income is also a decreasing function of higher taxation, the unemployment rate, and 
the ex post real long term interest rate.  Clearly, among other things, this estimate provides strong 
support for the three basic hypotheses being investigated in this study.    
In column (d) of Table 4, six of the seven of the estimated non-trend coefficients exhibit 
the expected signs, with five statistically significant at the 1% level and one statistically 
significant at the 2.5% level; once again (as in column (c) of Table 4), in the log-log 
specification, the interest rate variable has the “wrong” sign but is not statistically significant at 
even the 10% level. The coefficients of determination (R2 = 0.81; adjusted R2 = 0.79) imply the 
model explains effectively four-fifths of the variation in the dependent variable. Furthermore, the 
F-statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level. In any case, once again, per capita real 
income is an increasing function of economic freedom, regulatory quality, and political stability. 
It also is positively impacted by having G8 status. Per capita real income is also a decreasing 
function of higher taxation and the unemployment rate.  Clearly, among other things, this 
estimate provides strong support for the three basic hypotheses being investigated in this study.     
Before closing this section of the study, it might be of interest to the reader for us to 
further interpret these log-log findings. We focus on those in columns (b) and (d) of Table 4 
since they are not only consistent for the most part but also include the additional G8DUMMY 
control variable. According to the findings in column (b), a 1% higher level of economic 
freedom (as measured by HECFR) implies that the per capita real income level will be 0.9% 
higher. According to column (d), a 1% higher level of economic freedom (as measured by 
GLECFR) implies that the per capita real income level will be 1.76% higher.14 These results 
imply strong support for the hypothesis that the level of per capita real income is positively 
impacted by a higher level of economic freedom. 
 Next, we examine the results for regulatory quality. In column (b), a 1% higher level of 
regulatory quality (REGQUAL) implies a 1.01% higher level of per capita real income, whereas 
in column (d), a 1% higher level of REGQUAL implies a 1.19% higher level of per capita real 
income. These results strongly support our hypothesis that the level of per capita real income is 
an increasing function of regulatory quality. 
                                                 
14 A stronger impact resulting from the GLECFR variable than from the HECFR variable is expected based on the 
discussion earlier in this paper and is consistent with the other results in Tables 2, 3, and 4. 
Examining the results for the tax burden variable, TAXREVGDP, the finding in column 
(b) implies that a 1% higher tax burden level would reduce the level of per capita real income by 
0.37%, whereas the finding in column (d) implies that a 1% higher tax burden would reduce the 
per capita real income by 0.45%. These results both strongly support the hypothesis being 
investigated here that the level of per capita real income is a decreasing function of the overall ax 
burden in an economy.  
As for the other findings, in columns (b) and (d) of Table 4, a 1% rise in the index of 
political stability raises the level of per capita real income by 0.16% and 0.24%, respectively. 
These results are consistent with our expectations in this study. Next, in columns (b) and (d), a 
1% higher unemployment rate reduces the level of per capita real income by 0.19% in both 
cases. Although the interest rate variable is statistically insignificant in column (d) of Table 4, 
the finding in column (b) of Table 4 implies that a 1% higher ex post real interest rate would 
lower the level of per capita real income by 0.35%. The latter finding is consistent with our 
expectations. Finally, there are the results for the G8DUMMY variable. Following Halvorsen and 
Palmquist (1980), according to columns (b) and (d), being a G8 nation implies a roughly 0.17% 
or 0.25% higher level of per capita real income. 
5. Summary 
This study of the impacts of economic freedom, regulatory quality, and taxation on the level of 
per capita real GDP among OECD nations/”regions” over the 2003-2009 period adopts two 
alternative measures of economic freedom (one computed by the Heritage Foundation (2013) 
and one computed by Gwartney and Lawson (2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009)) and 
provides PLS fixed effects estimates for linear, linear-log, and log-log specifications. Each 
nation during this time frame can be regarded either as a nation per se or as a de facto “economic 
region” within the OECD.  The eight estimations in this study all provide strong support for the 
three central hypotheses considered here, namely: (1) the higher the degree of economic 
freedom, the higher the per capita real income (GDP) level; (2) the higher the level of regulatory 
quality, the higher the level of per capita real income (GDP); and (3) the higher the overall tax 
burden, expressed as a percent of GDP, the lower the level of per capita real income (GDP).  
Naturally, these conclusions are at least somewhat preliminary. More work, using 
alternative data and additional years need to be considered and estimated. In addition, alternative 
specifications involving additional or different variables (including different control variables) 
could yield broader, if not more compelling, insights. Thus, although these results would appear 
to suggest a strong relationship between the level of per capita real income (GDP) on the one 
hand and economic freedom, regulatory quality, and the overall tax burden on the other hand, 
this topic requires further scrutiny and formal investigation.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable    Mean  Standard Deviation 
 
RPCY     26,248  11,651 
 
HECFR    69.95  8.19 
 
REGQUAL    65.11  21.84 
 
TAXREVGDP    35.92  7.198 
 
POLSTAB    88.5  26.6 
 
UR     6.55  3.17 
     
RLONGINTR    4.58  2.23  
 
GLECFR    7.5  0.51     
 
G8DUMMY    0.241  0.43   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Linear Estimates (Fixed Effects)  
Dependent Variable:  RPCY            
Economic Freedom Measure: Heritage Foundation     Gwartney-Lawson 
 
(a)                                 (b)                                                 
Explanatory Variables  
 
HECFR   348**   -----      
    (2.44)        
 
GLECFR   -------   7,857*** 
       (3.75) 
          
REGQUAL   382***  399***     
    (7.18)   (7.42)      
  
TAXREVGDP   -248**   -374***   
    (-2.27)   (-3.45)       
 
POLSTAB   98.46***  111****     
    (2.65)   (3.12)       
 
UR    -692*   -701***   
    (-2.04)   (-3.46)       
 
RLONGINTR   -1,564***  -2,125***    
    (-2.66)   (-5.68)       
 
TR    -1,362   -0.02*   
    (-1.51)   (-2.07)     
 
Constant   -1,852   -299   
    (-0.14)   (-0.34)      
  
R2    0.65   0.71       
adjR2    0.62   0.68       
F      20.86***  27.03***      
   
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 2.5% level; *statistically 
significant at 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Linear-log PLS Estimates (Fixed Effects)  
Dependent Variable:  RPCY    
Economic Freedom Measure: Heritage Foundation     Gwartney-Lawson 
 
(a)  (b)                            
Explanatory Variables  
 
Log HECFR   24,502***  ------- 
    (2.64)    
Log GLECFR   -------   36,261* 
       (2.12) 
Log REGQUAL  19,511***  11,157*** 
    (7.12)   (4.33) 
Log TAXREVGDP  -11,583***  -8,885* 
    (-2.97)   (-1.99) 
Log POLSTAB  6,394*   1,416 
    (2.11)   (0.60) 
Log UR   -6,461**  -7,408*** 
    (-2.35)   (-3.57) 
Log RLONGINTR  -6,665***  -12,432*** 
    (-2.95)   (-5.02) 
TR    -1,304   281 
    (-1.43)   (0.28) 
Constant   -119,105**  -35,675 
    (-2.30)   (-0.76) 
 
R2    0.64   0.64    
adjR2    0.61   0.61    
F                 20.09***   20.18***   
 
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 2.5% level; *statistically 
significant at 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Log-log PLS Estimates (Fixed effects)  
Dependent Variable:  Log RPCY    
Economic Freedom Measure:  
    Heritage Foundation  Gwartney-Lawson Heritage Foundation  Gwartney-Lawson 
     
(a)                              (b)  (c)  (d)                       
Explanatory Variables  
 
Log HECFR  0.83**   0.90*** -------  ------- 
   (2.32)   (2.60) 
Log GLECFR  -------   -------  1.74*** 1.76*** 
        (2.61)  (2.76) 
Log REGQUAL 1.02***  1.01*** 1.22*** 1.19*** 
   (7.39)   (7.30)  (7.97)  (8.06) 
Log TAXREVGDP -0.42***  -0.37** -0.57*** -0.45** 
   (-2.71)   (-2.52)  (-2.64)  (-2.29) 
Log POLSTAB 0.16   0.16*** 0.21*  0.24*** 
   (1.55)   (3.32)  (1.98)  (5.13) 
Log UR  -0.19***  -0.19*** -0.17** -0.19*** 
   (-2.62)   (-2.70)  (-2.33)  (-2.77) 
Log RLONGINTR -0.40***  -0.35*** 0.045  0.001  
   (-3.55)   (-2.97)  (0.55)  (0.01) 
G8DUMMY  -------   0.16*** -------  0.24*** 
      (3.32)    (5.13) 
TR   -0.09**  -0.09** -0.03  -0.03    
   (-2.57)   (-2.41)  (-0.77)  (-0.64) 
Constant  4.3**   3.71*  2.98  2.7 
   (2.37)   (2.08)  (1.86)  (1.80) 
 
R2   0.77   0.79  0.79  0.81 
adjR2   0.75   0.76  0.77  0.79 
F     38.05***   35.17*** 41.78*** 41.5*** 
 
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 2.5% level; *statistically 
significant at 5% level. 
